U.S. Capitol police learned Congress was the target of extremist groups three days before violence broke out on Jan. 6, but the information didn’t make it to decision-makers tasked with protecting the seat of America’s government.
A new bipartisan report from two U.S. Senate committees investigating the Jan. 6 storming in Washington, D.C identified a number of security failures that allowed the incident to spiral out of control. Law enforcement officials saw signs of potential violence, but the report concluded that flawed planning and poor communication left police flat-footed when peaceful demonstrations turned into a mob determined to prevent the presidential election from being certified.
U.S. Sen. Gary Peters, D-Bloomfield Township, chairs one of two committees that launched an investigation into what went wrong. Peters said the 127-page report, released early Tuesday, found “unacceptable, widespread breakdowns” in security preparations and emergency response.
The report comes more than one week after legislation to create a bipartisan commission tasked with investigating the Jan. 6 storming failed in the Senate. Republicans argued the two Senate committees make further investigation by another commission unnecessary.
The Senate report makes a number of recommendations to improve emergency planning and intelligence gathering efforts in the future. The findings are based on the testimony of high-ranking federal officials, written statements from police officers and other documents.
It does not examine former President Donald Trump’s alleged role in promoting protests, which sparked an impeachment trial before he left office.
Problems highlighted by the report involve nearly every organization tasked with protecting the Capitol, ranging from federal intelligence agencies to police on the ground. Peters, who was not made available to comment before the report’s release, also credited the “heroic actions” of U.S. Capitol Police, D.C. Metropolitan Police and National Guardsmen who ultimately stopped protesters from blocking the election certification.
Much of the report details what was known about the potential for violence in the weeks before Jan. 6.
Security officials were aware that groups were planning to oppose the electoral vote at least a month before the attack, according to the Senate report. Police found more evidence suggesting demonstrations could turn violent, but this information wasn’t properly communicated.
U.S. Capitol Police compiled the first assessment of their findings on Dec. 16, 2020. The assessment was updated three times as new information indicated a massive protest was being planned for Jan. 6.
Capitol police identified several organizations expected to participate, including Proud Boys, Oath Keepers, white supremacist groups, antifascists and “Stop the Steal.” Police found online posts suggesting a former leader of the Oath Keepers was encouraging people to take up arms on Jan. 6.
Police found blog posts on a pro-Trump website thedonald.win that included maps of the Capitol campus and tunnels used by members of Congress. Users of the blog allegedly discussed confronting lawmakers and legally carrying firearms.
“If a million patriots show up bristling with AR’s, just how brave do you think they’ll be when it comes to enforcing their unconstitutional laws?” read one blog post identified in the Senate report. “Don’t cuck out. This is do or die. Bring your guns.”
Tips from private citizens and law enforcement partners also warned of plans to storm federal buildings.
A final assessment compiled by Capitol police on Jan. 3, three days before the storming, determined the upcoming protests could create a “significantly dangerous situation.” Analysts determined “Congress itself is the target” of protesters who viewed Jan. 6 as the last opportunity to challenge the presidential election.
The Senate report determined this critical information was not shared with Capitol Police leaders, rank-and-file officers or law enforcement partners. Daily intelligence reports downplayed the likelihood of violence. Security officials were left with an inconsistent picture of possible threats, the report states.
Capitol Police did increase security measures, but several officers testified that they received no warning about the potential for violent protests. Officers testified that they were provided little to no direction when stormers began pushing past barriers.
One officer testified that police were “totally on our own” during the chaos.
The Senate report also states most Capitol Police officers didn’t have protective equipment or proper training.
Seven specialty Civil Disturbance Unit platoons were activated on Jan. 6, but only four platoons were outfitted with special protective equipment, according to the report. Platoons were not authorized to wear the equipment at the beginning of their shifts, and in at least one instance, equipment was locked in a bus that couldn’t be accessed.
Former Capitol Police Chief Steven Sund, who resigned after the storming, testified that his department was prepared for the possibility of violence, but not “a coordinated military-style attack” on the Capitol.
Sund’s replacement testified that Capitol Police should have been more prepared based on what was known at the time. Acting Chief Yogananda Pittman said police knew the event would be attended by militia groups and that Congress would be targeted.
The FBI also uncovered information about potential threats that didn’t make it to the proper authorities, according to the Senate report.
The FBI’s Norfolk Field Office found online conversations about breaking into the U.S. Capitol. One thread highlighted by the FBI called others to “get violent” and “go there ready for war.”
One day before the storming, those details were reported to law enforcement partners in the region. However, Pittman and Sund testified that they did not receive it.
The Senate report identifies other problems that delayed National Guard troops from responding until several hours after the Capitol was breached.
A Capitol Police Board comprised of the House and Senate sergeants at arms and the architect of the Capitol is responsible for declaring emergencies. Sund testified that he asked the board to declare an emergency and authorize National Guard assistance on Jan. 4, but the request was denied.
Sund tried again to receive help from the National Guard on Jan. 6 when the Capitol Building was under siege.
Protesters breached the building shortly after 2 p.m. and broke into the Senate chamber roughly an hour later. Acting Secretary of Defense Christopher Miller said the death of a pro-Trump protester who was shot by police just before 3 p.m. made it clear that law enforcement had lost control of the situation.
Officials disagreed on the exact timeline of the request and its approval, but the National Guard took several hours to gear up and arrive at the scene. The Senate report states the National Guard wasn’t prepared to quickly respond.
Over the next three hours, law enforcement agencies fought to clear the Capitol. National Guardsmen arrived after 5:20 p.m., after the House and Senate chambers were secured.
The Senate committees identified a number of recommendations based on the findings of the investigation, including allowing the Capitol Police chief to directly request National Guard assistance and improvements to training, equipment, intelligence collection and operational planning.
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